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1 Introduction
In the years following the global financial and the euro area sovereign debt crisis,
the process of financial integration in the euro areamoved into reverse as firms and
households in the southern European periphery started to face much higher
borrowing costs than their counterparts in the northern core. One of the key
channels at the heart of this financial fragmentation was the interbank market,
where the costs of cross-border lending rose sharply, and volumes fell dramati-
cally, in particular in peripheral economies, thereby likely having contributed to
reinforcing the macroeconomic fallout from the sharp collapse in aggregate de-
mand. Although market segregation gradually receded over the past few years,
probably also thanks to the actions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB),
normal market functioning has not yet been fully restored. At face value, these
facts contradict the predictions of standard open-economy models in which
complete financial markets can be expected to facilitate, rather than to mute,
effective risk-sharing and thereby help temper the adverse effects of asymmetric
shocks.
Against this background, and with a view to improving our understanding of
recent events, this article analyses the role of frictions in the interbank market of a
currency union and examines howunconventionalmonetary policymeasuresmay
mitigate, or offset, the effects such frictions may have on financial conditions and,
ultimately, on output and inflation. To this aim,we develop, calibrate and simulate
a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which
lending banks obtain funds from both domestic and foreign savings banks to
refinance mortgage and private-sector business loans, but where interbank
lending is subject to both borrower and country-specific idiosyncratic risk. Using
this framework, we show that (i) the strength of the financial accelerator, when
applied to banks operating under uncertainty in an interbank market, will criti-
cally depend on the economic and financial structure of the economy; (ii) adverse
shocks to the real economy can be the source of banking crises, causing an in-
crease in the interbank funding costs, aggravating the initial shock; and (iii) asset
purchase policies and central bank long-term refinancing operations can both be
an effective substitute, or complement, to changes in the conventional monetary
policy instrument.
The interbank market plays a pivotal role in the euro area. Its smooth func-
tioning is central for banks to cope efficiently with idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
and to ensure a uniform transmission of the common monetary policy stance.
Frictions in the interbankmarketmay blur the signal coming frommonetary policy
and ultimately hamper its transmission. One reason why interbank markets may
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not operate efficiently has to do with transaction costs: owing to the unsecured
lending nature of the market, and its over-the-counter (OTC) structure,1 trading
relationships are often plagued by asymmetric information, counterparty risk, and
search and monitoring costs (see e.g., Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar 2011; Flannery
1996). As a result, banks’ wholesale market funding costs may differ across the
currency union, and some banks may face hard borrowing constraints, which
could affect both credit supply and the ultimate borrowing conditions of the non-
financial sector. This alsomeans that interbankmarket rates may be insufficient to
characterize the monetary policy stance, even at times away from the effective
lower bound.
These frictions are particularly relevant in cross-border transactions, where
differences in banking supervision up until the introduction of the Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM) in 2014,2 the state of the business cycle, insolvency laws
or accounting standards may obfuscate the evaluation of the creditworthiness of
foreign banks and expose lenders to uncertain counterparty risk. Freixas and
Holthausen (2005) show that such market imperfections may cause liquidity
shortages or the payment of interest rate premia that reflect the adverse selection of
borrowers across countries. In crisis times, these effects may become even more
visible. Using bank-to-bank loan-level data from TARGET23, Abbassi et al. (2014)
find that for the same borrower on the same trading day, and after controlling for
lender and borrower fixed effects, cross-border loans were up to 25 basis points
more expensive than domestic loans in the first three months following the
collapse of the former investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008. De Andoain,
Hoffmann, and Manganelli (2014) estimate that the premium charged to banks in
more stressed economies spiked even more dramatically, reaching over 63 basis
points. The presence of risk premia unrelated to the specific borrower suggests that
information asymmetry constraints are important and that factors other than direct
counterparty risks may also drive pricing behavior in interbank markets. Despite
the empirical studies quantifying the effects of financial fragmentation, the precise
source of these cross-border frictions remains an open question. A common view is
that the risk of cross-border lending, particular to stressed economies, was being
1 Electronic trading accounted for less than 10% of total unsecured transactions in 2014 (ECB
2015).
2 Even after the introduction of the SSM, national competent authorities retain discretion in
applying common rules (see Nouy 2017).
3 TARGET2 is the Eurosystem’s payment and settlement system and carries out more than 90% of
all fund flows between pairs of credit institutions in the euro area.
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reassessed in the presence of imperfect information4. This view motivates the
inclusion of an additional monitoring cost in the cross-border interbank market
that rises in the face of heightened risk.
Cross-border interbank lending has been and continues to be an important
element of the financial structure in the euro area. Prior to the outbreak of the
global financial crisis, more than half of the average daily turnover in the unse-
cured market was with non-domestic euro area counterparts (ECB 2009a). Strong
credit growth in parts of the euro area, buoyant financial innovation and lax
financial regulation all contributed to an increasing reliance on confidence-
sensitive wholesale funding, with banks in current account surplus countries
providing funding to banks in current account deficit countries (see van Rixtel and
Gasperini 2013). After the outbreak of the crisis, the share of cross-border interbank
lending fell dramatically to just over 25% in 2013 before recovering again to reach
levels around 40% in 2014, the latest available figures according to the ECB (ECB
2015).
These sharp variations in the funding structure of banks – broadly speaking
the mix between wholesale and deposit funding – may have had severe re-
percussions on their operations and their willingness and ability to extend credit to
the non-financial sector. Several empirical studies document that banks whose
liabilities are mainly sticky household deposits, which are often protected by
generous government insurance schemes, continued to lend in the aftermath of the
crisis, whereas banks that relied predominantly on debt funding fared worse
(Cornett et al. 2011; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein
2010). In other words, wholesale funding, and cross-border funding in particular,
makes banks more vulnerable to changes in market financing conditions with
possibly strong repercussions on bank lending. These studies therefore tend to
suggest that real shocks may be amplified, and financial shocks accelerated, by
banks’ structural recourse to wholesale financing.
Despite its empirical relevance, however, few efforts have been undertaken to
study themainmechanisms andpropagation channels of the interbankmarket in a
structural model of the macroeconomy. Indeed, financing frictions were long ab-
sent in a general equilibrium context. The dominance of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem (1958) that the financing structure of a firm is irrelevant for its value
confined the analysis to real and nominal frictions in the wider economy (Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007). The seminal work
by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and the subsequent contributions by
4 Imperfect information in relation to growth potential and the future profitability of destination
banks, and with respect to the possible implications of the heightened sovereign risk (see Al-Eyd
and Berkmen 2013; IMF 2013).
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Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003, 2010, 2014) and Iacoviello (2005) made
financial factors acceptable, and even desirable, in workhorse general equilibrium
models. Their studies showed that asymmetric information, agency problems and
borrowing constraints are important factors in driving and amplifying business
cycles.
Yet, less progress has beenmade in understanding the impact of the financing
structure of banks on lending conditions of the private sector and, hence, on
aggregate output and inflation. In the pioneering work of Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003), and in work that
followed (cf. Christensen andDib 2008; DeGraeve 2008; Goodfriend andMccallum
2007), banks were either relegated to act as simple intermediaries between savers
and borrowers or were operating under perfect competition.
It was only more recently that a more prominent role was given to banks in
general equilibriummodels. Gerali et al. (2010) and Darracq Paries, Sørensen, and
Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2011) illustrate the effects of imperfect competition in the
banking industry on credit spreads and show that changes in banks’ leverage ratio
can impact loan supply conditions. However, in these models, banks can obtain
funding in a frictionless interbankmarket at the rate set by the central bank. Others
have made attempts to model the interbank market more explicitly. Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), building on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), introduce a borrowing
constraint in the interbank market by assuming that banks may divert borrowed
assets for personal gain, causing a spread between lending and deposit rates. In
the face of an adverse shock, this spread widens, which raises the cost of credit of
firms, affecting real activity.
Dib (2010) and deWalque, Pierrard, and Rouabah (2010) include an interbank
market in which, due to an implicit enforceability problem, borrowing banks can
choose an optimal level of default,5 and where banks must hold a regulatory level
of capital. Calibrated for the US economy, both papers show that bank capital
attenuates, rather than amplifies, the real effects of shocks in this framework.
Hilberg and Hollmayr (2011) incorporate a secured interbank market into an
otherwise standard DSGE model and study the impact of central bank collateral
policy on interbank lending rates. They show that a change in the haircut applied
to central bank refinancing operations can be effective in steering interbank rates,
but that the presence of an interbank market also attenuates the effects of con-
ventional monetary policy. Similarly, Carrera and Vega (2012) model the in-
teractions between banks’ reserve requirements and interbank lending activity,
which they assume is costly due to monitoring costs. They find that an increase in
5 That is, default is not related to banks’ own idiosyncratic risks but a choice variable subject to an
exogenous cost of default.
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required reserves increases demand in the competitive interbank market and
pushes up the interest rate charged on these operations as lending banks will have
to pay higher monitoring costs. Funding conditions in the interbank market then
trickle down to lending and deposit rates, affecting real activity. In the framework
of Carrera and Vega (2012), changes in reserve requirements are therefore quali-
tatively similar to traditional changes in policy rates.
Cross-border interbank lending, by contrast, has been largely ignored so far in
the literature. In’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) examine the role of international
capital flows in the boom-bust cycle in Spain by allowing borrowing-constrained
households to borrow directly from foreign lenders. Using an estimated three-
countrymodel, theyfind that the convergence of interest rates in Spain to the levels
prevailing in other euro area Member States, a loosening of collateral constraints
as well as falling risk premia on Spanish housing and capital has fueled the
Spanish housing boom. In similar spirit to our paper, Ueda (2012) studies the
international propagation of shocks in an open economy model in which banks
lend both domestically and internationally. Whereas intermediaries in our model
face a single-layer credit constraint with two parts: a cross-border cost of credit that
increases in domestic risk, and the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial
accelerator; Ueda (2012) introduces nested credit constraints so both firms and
intermediaries face an external finance premium. The authors use this to assess the
necessary conditions to cause a global economic downturn, whereas we focus on
the role of policy when cross-border frictions are present. Poutineau and Ver-
mandel (2015) model the banking sector explicitly in a two-country DSGE model.
Contrary to Quint and Rabanal (2014), who study the optimal design of macro-
prudential policies in the euro area in a two-country DSGE model, they allow for
cross-border lending to firms and banks. They find that cross-border loans amplify
the propagation of country-specific shocks. Dräger andProaño (2015) also allow for
cross-border banking where an international wholesale branch is collecting de-
posits from across the currency union and distributes them to retail banks in the
two countries. Although theirmodel does not give rise to interbankflows, similar to
Poutineau andVermandel (2015), they find that cross-border banking amplifies the
effects of exogenous shocks in a currency union.
In this article, we try to bring the various strands of the literature together by
incorporating credit risk in the interbank market of a currency union in a New
Keynesian two-country, two-sector model with sticky prices, habits in consump-
tion and investment adjustment costs. There are two types of banks in each
country: savings banks, which have excess liquidity that they are willing to trade
across borders in the interbank market, and lending banks, which operate under a
structural liquidity deficit and require funding that they can obtain from the un-
secured area-wide interbank market. Following the costly state verification
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framework of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), lending banks face idio-
syncratic loan return shocks that are unobservable from the point of view of sav-
ings banks. A positive probability of default gives rise to an external finance
premium that depends on the leverage of the borrower.
In addition, lending banks face a risk premium when taking a position in the
cross-border interbank market. This second friction is in the same spirit as the
external financial intermediation premium in Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne
(2008), but tailored to the features of an interbank market: when the risk in the
domestic economy increases, foreign lenders demand a higher rate of interest vis-
à-vis the borrower from that country as counterparty risk rises, thereby driving a
further wedge between the policy rate and interbank lending rates.
We use our model to answer three important questions: (1) how is the trans-
mission ofmonetary policy in a currency union affectedwhen financing conditions
in the interbankmarket depend on the quality of banks’ balance sheets; (2) how do
asymmetric shocks to the value of assets propagate through a currencyunionwhen
savings banks differentiate between domestic and foreign borrowers in the inter-
bank market; and (3) how effective are some of the measures central banks have
taken in the recent past to address funding bottlenecks in the interbank market?
Regarding the first question, we find that our model exhibits the financial
accelerator effect (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999) in the face of a
common monetary policy shock but that, compared to previous findings in the
literature, there are noticeable differences in the way our model can give rise to
changes in the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, compared to a
situation where the financial accelerator operates directly at the balance sheet of
firms, the strength and at times also the direction of propagation crucially depends
on the share of saver households in the economy, the asset composition of lending
banks’ balance sheets and the degree of competition in the lending market.
Regarding the second question, our model is able to replicate some of the key
features of the financial crisis that resulted in a segmented interbank market.6 We
show that capital flows resulting from international financial integration can be
highly procyclical, fluctuating in response to business cycles, thereby raising
financial and economic fragility even before a crisis emerges, mainly by fostering
credit growth. This means that in the wake of an adverse shock to the value of
assets in one country, the rate charged by foreign lenders in the common interbank
6 In our model we focus on loan return risk. Ultimately, the implications of our findings are more
broad based and less dependent on the ultimate source of risk. For example, the sharp increase in
spreads paid by banks in stressed Member States during the sovereign debt crisis (see e.g., De
Andoain, Hoffmann, andManganelli 2014) works through the same channel, that is, a (perceived)
deterioration in the quality of banks’ balance sheets.
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market will rise as banks’ balance sheets deteriorate amid a fall in the collateral
value. The increase in the interbank funding cost of banks in this economy offsets,
to some extent, the effort by the central bank to stimulate the (area-wide) economy
by lowering the policy rate in response to the initial shock. That is, compared to a
modelwithout cross-border interbank lending, and contrary to union-wide shocks,
monetary policy will be less effective. Moreover, as foreign funding becomes more
expensive, the economy that draws the shock is forced to improve its trade balance
more sharply relative to the case without financial frictions.
Finally, we study the effectiveness of two of the ECB’s recent non-standard
measures. We find that providing long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) to
banks increases the effectiveness of monetary policy per unit of stimulus – that is,
LTROs empower conventional monetary policy. The second policy focuses on the
ECB’s asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) that is particularly
well suited to study in our model economy. Although securitization is more
complex in practice, the ultimate effects of the ABSPP can bewell approximated by
assuming that the central bank purchases risky loans directly from banks, thereby
freeing up bank balance sheet capacity and reducing their funding costs in the
interbank market. We find that asset purchases in the form of loans, either directly
or through purchases of ABS, can be an effective substitute, or complement, to
reductions in the key policy rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model
setup. Section 3 discusses model calibration and Section 4 presents numerical
simulations, illustrating the role of the interbankmarket in driving the dynamics of
the model. Section 5 analyzes the effects of the ECB’s policy measures, while
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Themodel is made up of two economies that share a single currency andmonetary
policy. In each economy there are two types of households, savers and borrowers,
monopolistic competitive firms, savings and lending banks as well as a fiscal
authority. The two economies, of size n and (1−n), trade in both non-durable
consumption goods and financial services in the form of interbank credit. In the
following, we describe the decision-making problems of the economic agent’s
resident in the home economy. Unless otherwise stated, analogous conditions
hold for the foreign economy. The time notation refers to the period in which the
value is determined.
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2.1 Households
The household sector is made up of a mass λ ∈ [0, 1] of patient households with
discount factor β and (1−λ) of impatient householdswith discount factor βB < β. The
patient households are referred to as the savers and the impatient households as
the borrowers.
2.1.1 Savers
The saver household h ∈ [0, λ] chooses the level of consumption of non-durable
goodsCh, t, hoursworked Lh, t, the housing stockDh, t, andbankdeposit savings Sh, t




βs{ 9 ln(Ch, t+s − κCt+s−1) + (1 − 9) ln(Dh, t+s−1) − L1+ϕh, t+s1 + ϕ}
subject to the nominal budget constraint
PCt Ch, t + PDt (Dh, t − (1 − δD)Dh, t−1) + Sh, t ≤ RSt−1Sh, t−1 +WtLh, t + πt − Tt ,
where ϱ determines the relative weight of non-durable consumption in the saver’s
utility and κ the degree of external habit formation in consumption. The parameter
ϕ refers to the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. PCt and P
D
t are the price
indices for consumption and housing goods respectively (see derivation below).
δD ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of housing. The saver can deposit his
savings in domestic bankswhich pay the risk-free nominal interest rateRSt . Finally,
the saver provides labor at the flexible nominal wage rateWt and owns the stock of
net wealth of the economy, except for housing that is in part also owned by the
borrower household, therefore receiving profits πt from the banking and corporate
sector and paying lump sum taxes Tt.
Because saver households have the same preferences over consumption,
housing, labor, savings and investment, and are assumed to have the same initial
wealth, we focus on a representative saver from now onwards and drop the h
subscript. The saver household chooses the optimal inter-temporal plan subject to
the budget constraint, resulting in a set of familiar first-order conditions that will
hold in equilibrium:
1  RSt Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt+1 ] (2.1)
λCt Q
D
t  β Et[λDt + (1 − δD)QDt+1λCt+1] (2.2)






where λCt and λ
D
t are the marginal utilities of consumption and housing respec-
tively, and Λt, t+1 ≡ β
λCt+1
λCt
is the real stochastic discount factor over the interval
[t, t + 1]. Because housing,Dh, t, is chosen one period in advance, themarginal utility,
λDt , is discounted by β. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are the Euler equations implied by the
demand for domestic deposits and the demand for housing respectively. The relative
price of housing is given by QDt ≡
PDt
PCt





wage rate is given by wt  Wt/PCt , which is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption in equilibrium (2.3).
2.1.2 Borrowers
Preferences of the borrowers are the same as those of the saver except for the









subject to the nominal budget constraint
PCt C
B
h, t + PDt (DBh, t − (1 − δD)DBh, t−1) + RMt−1CRHHh, t−1 # CRHHh, t +WtLBh, t .
The notations are identical to the saver household and where the superscript B
characterizes variables specific to borrowers. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Iacoviello (2005), borrowers finance their consumption of housing with credit
CRHHh, t obtained from lending banks at the mortgage rate R
M
h, t. Banks impose
collateral constraints of the form
CRHHh, t ≤mEt[PDt+1] DBh, t 1RMt .
That is, banks will only lend to the point that total repayment is a fractionm of the
expected housing value, with a view to ensuring that households will not default
the following period. Under uncertainty, the borrowers could self-insure in some
states of the world by borrowing below the limit to protect against the effects of
adverse shocks. To avoid issues introduced by occasionally binding constraints,
we therefore follow Iacoviello (2005) and choose the parameterm to minimize the
probability of this occurring.
The decision-making problems of the representative borrower household lead
to a labor supply condition analogous to that of the saver household. The housing
investment decision leads to an Euler equation of the form
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λC,Bt Q
D
t  β Et[λD,Bt + (1 − δD −m)QDt+1λC,Bt+1 ] + Et[λC,Bt QDt+1ΠCt, t+1RMt ]m. (2.4)
This differs from that of the savers due to a wedge between the marginal utility of
consumption and the marginal benefit of housing, introduced by the borrowing
constraint. In the case thatm = 0, so there is no constraint, the two expressions are
analogous.
2.2 Firms
We introduce nominal rigidities in the price of consumption goods following
Calvo (1983). To this end, we assume there are two types of firms in the model
economy: intermediate goods firms that are price takers in perfect competition,
and final goods firms that operate under monopolistic competition. There is
‘price-stickiness’ introduced in the latter sector as only afixedproportion offirms is
able to update prices each period.
2.2.1 Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate goods producer purchases capital goods KDt and hires labor L
D
t
to produce a homogeneous output Yw,t subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
function
Yw, t  AtZt(KDt−1)α(LDt )1−α,
where the superscript D indicates factor demand and Atand Zt are, respectively,
stationary union-wide and country-specific total factor productivity shocks. Both
are modeled as AR(1) processes: aAt  ρAaAt−1 + εAt where at ≡ ln At and with a
normal i.i.d. shock εAt . There is an equivalent process for zt ≡ lnZt. Taking the
aggregate real wage indexwt as given, the profit maximization implies labor demand
is given by





where Pw,t is the price at which the output is sold to all final goods firms. This
implies that Pw, t/P
C
t  mct is the real marginal cost in the final goods sector. New
capital is purchased from capital producers at the end of the period at real priceQt.
Due to the constant returns to scale in production, capital is paid at the marginal
product







If capital depreciates at rate δK, it follows that the gross nominal return on capital is
given by
RKt 
rKt + (1 − δK)QKt
QKt−1
ΠCt−1, t . (2.7)
The end-of-period capital purchase decision of firms will ensure the expected
discounted gross return on capital will equal the expected discounted cost of
funds. We will return to this in the discussion of the banking sector below.
2.2.2 Capital Producers
For convenience, and without loss of generality, we introduce perfectly competi-
tive capital producers that make new capital goods and sell to firms. Capital fol-
lows the law of motion
Kt  (1 − δK)Kt−1 +  [1 − S( IKt
IKt−1
)]IKt
where IKt is investment and, following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
the function S(⋅) is increasing in changes to investment, given by
S( IKt
IKt−1















where PPt is the domestic producer price and Q
K
t the real price of capital. This leads
to the first-order condition
PPt
PCt
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2.2.3 Final Goods Producers
Each final goods producer firm j purchases output from the intermediate goods
sector at price Pw,t and converts it into a differentiated good sold at price P
P
t (j) to
households, durable goods producers and the fiscal authority. Summing the de-
mand schedules from each buyer (see Section 2.2.4) implies a total demand for
good j given by
Yt(j)  (PPt (j)
PPt
)−σYt .
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different varieties,
assumed to be identical across the currency union. Every period, each firm faces a
fixed probability 1−ξ that it will be able to update its price. Denoting the optimal
price at time t for good j as P*t(j), the firms allowed to reoptimize prices maximize









Yt+k(j)[P*t(j) − Pw, t+k].
The solution to the price-setting problem yields a price P*t which is independent of
the firm’s history of prices and therefore optimal for all price setters. With real
















kΛt, t+k(ΠPt, t+k)σ(ΠCt, t+k)−1Yt+k .
Using the aggregate producer price indexPPt and the fact that all resettingfirmswill
choose the same price, by the law of large numbers we can find the evolution of the
price index as given by
(PPt )1−σ  ξ(PPt−1)1−σ + (1 − ξ)(P*t )1−σ. (2.10)
While the distribution of prices is not required to track the evolution of the
aggregate price index, it implies a loss of output due to dispersion in prices. Final
output is given by Yt  Yw, t 1Δt where price dispersion is given by
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for non-optimizing firms j= 1,…, J. As a proportion (1−ξ ) offirmswill optimize prices
in period t and knowing that the distribution of non-optimized prices will be the
same as the overall distribution, price dispersion can be written as a law of motion:
Δt  ξΠσt Δt−1 + (1 − ξ)(U1, tU2, t)
−σ
. (2.11)
2.2.4 Consumption Good Producers
Households purchase differentiated final goods and combine bundles of domes-










where τC can be interpreted as the degree of home bias in household consumption
expenditures, and θC is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
produced goods (see Armington 1969). Ht and IMt are bundles of differentiated














where the asterisk indicates variables of the foreign country. The households
purchase goodHt(j) from producer j ∈ (0, 1) at price PPt (j) to maximize (2.12) subject
to total expenditure PPt Ht  ∫10PPt (j)Ht(j)dj, with an equivalent problem for imports
IMt( j
*). This leads to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demand schedules
Ht(j)  (PPt (j)
PPt
)−σHt (2.14)
IMt(j*)  (PIMt (j*)
PIMt
)−σIMt . (2.15)
Equivalent conditions for the domestic demand of the investment good and gov-
ernment consumption good hold. We assume no pricing to market, which implies
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that PIMt  PP*t . The final goods firms take input prices as given and maximize their
profits PCt Ct − PPt Ht − PIMt IMt. Profit maximization yields the following demand




IMt  (1 − τC)(PIMt
PCt
)−θCCt . (2.17)
This leads to the consumer price index PCt given by
PCt  [τC(PPt )1−θC + (1 − τC)(PIMt )1−θC] 11−θC . (2.18)
2.2.5 Housing Producers
The price of durable housing goods can differ from that of consumption goods due
to the presence of adjustment costs. To ensure that savers and borrowers observe
the same house price, we let housing good producers augment the existing total
stock, DTt ≡ λDt + (1 − λ)DBt , according to the following law of motion:
DTt  (1 − δD)DTt−1 +  [1 − S( IDtIDt−1)]IDt , (2.19)
where we follow the same adjustment costs as faced in capital investment. The








(PDt+s[1 − S( IDt+sIDt−1+s)]IDt+s − PPt+sIDt+s ),
which leads to the first-order condition
PPt
PCt














There are two types of banks: savings banks that take deposits from domestic
households and lend in the currency union-wide interbank market and lending
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banks that provide loans to both domestic firms and households and finance these
using interbank borrowing and their own net worth. A financial friction emerges
due to idiosyncratic loan return shocks faced by lending banks. Costly state veri-
fication leads to an external finance premiumas in Bernanke, Gertler, andGilchrist
(1999). In addition, in light of the empirical evidence that borrower banks often
have to pay a premium that reflects not borrower but country-specific risks when
accessing the international interbank market (cf. Section 1), we add a further
friction whereby cross-border interbank credit faces additional monitoring costs
that depend on the prevailing risk in the lending market.
Savings banks operate under perfect competition with free entry, but aggre-
gate shocks can lead to unexpected profits or losses. The banks are owned by the
patient households who are paid all bank profits, or recapitalize banks if andwhen
necessary. Lending banks face idiosyncratic shocks when extending credit to the
real economy that are costly for creditors to observe. Limited liability implies that
these banks earn profits in equilibrium. Lending banks are treated slightly
differently to savings banks in that they pay a fixed dividend rate to ensure they
cannot become fully self-funded, equivalent to the assumption of an exogenous
exit rate or higher banker discounting (see e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
1999; Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010). The friction implies that equity is always more
valuable than debt, without which banks would not pay dividends in equilibrium.
Another difference is that savings banks can access central bank credit whereas
lending banks cannot. This is in part motivated by the risk exposure and
specialization of lending banks; savings banks are well diversified and the central
bank requires a proportion of safe assets as collateral.
2.3.1 Lending Banks
There are many lending banks of unit mass indexed b ∈ [0, 1]. They extend credit
CRt to the non-financial sector, which they finance with domestic IB
H
t and cross-
border IBFt interbank borrowing and net worth Nt:
CRt  Nt + IBHt + IBFt , (2.21)
where, following Poutineau and Vermandel (2015), IBHt and IB
F
t are chosen to
maximize a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) Armington aggregator (see
Armington 1969) of domestic and foreign interbank borrowing
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where τIB can be interpreted as a home bias in interbank borrowing and θIB is the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign borrowing.7 A non-zero θIB
implies that domestic and foreign interbank borrowing are not perfect substitutes,
rendering differences in lending rates. Maximization yields the following familiar
demand schedules:
IBHt  τIB(RIB,HtRIBt )
−θIB
IBt (2.22)
IBFt  (1 − τIB)(RIB, FtRIBt )
−θIB
IBt , (2.23)
whereRIB,Ht is the lendingrateonthedomestic interbankmarketandR
IB, F
t therateonthe
cross-border market. Using these demand schedules and RIBt IBt  RIB,Ht IBHt + RIB, Ft IBFt ,
composite interbank funding costs are given by
RIBt  [τIB(RIB,Ht )1−θIB + (1 − τIB)(RIB, Ft )1−θIB] 11−θIB . (2.24)
When granting loans to the non-financial private sector, we assume that lending
banks cannot diversify risk in their loan portfolio and that they experience idiosyn-
cratic loan return shocks ωt(b) that affect the value of the asset side of their balance
sheets.8 The shocks are log-normally distributed, log(ωt(b)) ∼ N ( −(σ2ω, t/2), σ2ω, t),
with mean Et[ωt]  1 and standard deviation σω, t, which is time-varying and is
modeled as an AR(1) process: log(σω, t)  (1 − ρσ) log(σω, ss) + ρσ log(σω, t−1) + uω, t
and uω, t ∼ N (0, σσ).
After aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks hit the economy, networth of lending
banks evolves according to
Nt(b)  ωt(b)RCRt CRt−1(b) − RIBt−1IBt−1(b), (2.25)
whereRCRt is the ex post return onbanks’ loan portfolioCRt. Limited liability implies
that if the realization of the shock is below a threshold value ωt, then the lending
bank will default on its interbank borrowing as they would otherwise be insolvent.






7 This setup provides incentive for banks to borrow from both domestic and foreign banks as
observed in the data and is analogous to preferences over domestic and foreign produced goods in
the trade part of the model.
8 Thus allowing us to study imperfect diversification in a tractable way.
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The lending banks will pay the saver households a fixed dividend rate, investing
all remaining profits in their own net worth. It is assumed that a defaulting bank
will exit but that for every exiting bank, a new one enters and is given a small start-
up fund by the other banks. This ensures that the number of banks is held constant
at any point in time. The idiosyncratic loan return and default leads to a distri-
bution of lending banks over all possible values of net worth.
The loan portfolio is comprised of mortgage loans to households CRHHt and
lending to firmsCRFt . The former are treated as nominal one-period bonds, whereas
for the latter it is convenient to consider it as state-contingent debt,9 offering ex
post, gross, nominal return given by RKt as defined above. The lending banks
specify a contract for interbank funds subject to participation constraints given in
the following section. After detailing the solution to the savings banks’ problem,
we discuss the contract that determines the demand for interbank credit and the
supply of credit to the non-financial private sector.
2.3.2 Savings Banks
A representative savings bank has access to the central bank’s liquidity providing
operations CBt, raises deposits St from patient households and extends both do-
mestic IBHt and cross-border IB
F*
t interbank loans:
St + CBt  IBHt + IBF*t . (2.27)










( R̃IB,Ht+s+1IBHt+s + R̃IB, Ft+s+1IBFt+s − RSt+sSt+s − Rt+sCBt+s ),
subject to the balance sheet, leads to the zero-arbitrage condition
Et[Λt, t+1
PCt+1





t is the ex post return on interbank lending, and the condition R
S
t  Rt
under standard one-period central bank finance, where Rt is the policy rate. The
savings bank can only observe the loan return of the lending bank if it pays a
proportional monitoring fee µ. As shown in Townsend (1979), the implication of
this costly state verification is that the fee will only be paid in the event of default,
9 As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). This is equivalent to the firms using state-contingent debt to
purchase the capital themselves. It is natural to assume that debt contracts are state-contingent
due to costless monitoring and enforcement and the risk neutrality of the lender.
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with all other debtors paying the same interest rate. Interbank lending is subject to
a participation constraint that accounts for the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
drawn by lending banks and the aggregate state of the economy.
For the domestic market, the savings banks require the expected real return
from granting each interbank loan to be equal to their expected real funding rate,
using the household Euler equation. This can be written as
1  Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt+1 [1 − F(ωt+1(b), σω, t+1)]RIB,Ht (b)]
+ Et⎡⎣Λt, t+1
ΠCt+1




IBHt (b) + IBFt (b)
dF(ω, σω, t+1) ⎤⎦, (2.28)
where F(ω(b), σ) ≡ ∫ω(b)
0
f(ω ; −σ22 , σ2)dω is the cumulative density function up to
ω(b), with probability density function f(ω ;   −σ22 , σ2). Note that this implies that
the value F(ωt+1(b), σω, t+1) is the probability of default. The first part of the term on
the right-hand side of equation (2.28) is the expected discounted return from the
1−F(⋅) non-defaulted loans, of which the agreed lending rate is RIB,Ht . The second
part is the expected discounted recovered value of post-defaulted loans, subject to
the cost µ. The interbank loans are used to refinance non-financial sector loans
with a rate of return ωRCRt+1 where ω is the idiosyncratic loan return shock, noting
that the lower the leverage, CRt(b)
IBHt (b)+IBFt (b)
, the higher the return to the creditor.
Equation (2.28) highlights the central role that the leverage plays in determining
the interest spread in the banking sector; the more highly borrowers are lever-
aged, the higher the rate of default and the lower the expected return from
defaulters. Because all banks will choose the same leverage ratio, individual
bank net worth does not affect the interest rate paid on credit, and equation (2.28)
will therefore also hold if the index b is dropped, with the variables treated as the
aggregate averages.10
When taking positions in the cross-border interbank market, we assume that
savings banks incur additional monitoring costs ΓIB, t that are increasing in the
level of risk within the economy. Such costs reflect factors such as asymmetric
information, counterparty risk as well as differences in cross-border macroeco-
nomic conditions. Specifically, it is given by
ΓIB, t  ζ σ(σ*ω, tσω − 1), (2.29)
10 As banks are atomistic, Λt, t+1 is independent of the idiosynctratic shock ωt + 1(b) drawn by the
bank, thus implying irrelevance of Nt(b) and allowing aggregation.
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which causes an increase to themonitoring costs following a shock to the variance
of the idiosyncratic loan return shock. That is, country-specific risk shocks will
cause an increase in the finance premium of borrowing banks in the cross-border
interbank market11. Therefore, the participation constraint for international
interbank loans can be expressed as
1  Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt+1 (1 − ΓIB, t)[1 − F(ω*t+1(b), σ*ω, t+1)]RIB, F, *t (b)]
+ Et⎡⎣Λt, t+1
ΠCt+1




IBH,∗t (b) + IBF,∗t (b)
⎤⎦, (2.30)
where G(ω*t+1(b), σ*ω, t+1) ≡ ∫ωt(b)0 ωdF(ω, σt) and Fbt  F(ωt(b), σt). As with (2.28),
the first part of the right-hand side of equation (2.30) is the discounted value of
non-defaulted interbank loans, although this now includes the cross-border





that is a function of themonitoring cost ΓIB, t, which
itself is increasing in the standard deviation of the loan return shock: a higher σω, t
will increase the risks of default by making lower realization of ωt(b) more likely.
2.3.3 Interbank Credit Market
To model the over-the-counter structure of the interbank market, we follow Ber-
nanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999 in our treatment of the lending contract. The
lending banks choose credit to the non-financial private sector CRt, the volume of
interbank lending IBHt and IB
F




t to maximize their
expected real net worth. The banks pay a fraction (1−γ) of their profits as a divi-
dend, with the remaining surplus retained as internal equity finance. Substituting
in the expression for ωt+1, the problem is written as
11 A common view is that heightened country-specific costs were due to the reassessment of the
risk of cross-border lending, particular to stressed economies, occurring in the presence of
imperfect information in relation to growth potential and the future profitability of destination
banks, and with respect to the possible implications of the heightened sovereign risk (see Al-Eyd
and Berkmen 2013; IMF 2013). The linear representation is a parsimonious way to capture the
impact of heightened uncertainty on borrowing costs. We have tried other functional forms with a
limited impact on the results.
12 As a reminder of notation, note that formost variables, an asterisk indicates the foreign country
variables. For the variables corresponding to cross-border flows, the distinction is less clear. RIB, F*t
and RIB,H
*





The participation constraint (2.30) is for home savings banks so is discounted with the home
stochastic discount factor, but depends on the financial positions of foreign-based lending banks.
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max
Xt
Et[Λt, t+1PCt+1 γ[1 − G(ωt+1) − (1 − F(ωt+1))ωt+1]RCRt+1CRt ], (2.31)
where Xt  {CRt , IBHt , IBFt ,RIB,Ht ,RIB, Ft } is a vector of controls, dropping the indi-
vidual bank index. Themaximization is subject to the bank balance sheet equation
(2.21), the interbank demand equations (2.22) and (2.23), the composite interest rate
(2.24), the loan-to-value equation (2.26), and the saver bank participation con-
straints given in equations (2.28) and (2.30).
The solution to the contract problem yields a condition that determines the
wedge between the nominal risk-free rate RSt and the expected return from credit to
the non-financial sector RCRt+1. We can express this as
Et[RCRt+1
RSt
]  Et[s(RSt ,RIB,Ht ,RIB, Ft , Γ*IB, t , IBtCRt ,ωt+1, σω, t+1)] (2.32)
with key arguments given, although the nominal stochastic discount factors of
both countries are also arguments of function s. In this solution, which is given in
full in the online appendix, the expected real return to lending is equated with the
real marginal cost of external finance. Because the solution is a function of the
leverage rather than the bank size, the contract interest rates will be independent
of the bank’s ownhistory of shocks. As leverage increases, the capital-asset ratio NtCRt
falls, the probability of default increases, and themarginal cost of borrowing rises.
This is the financial accelerator mechanism; if, for instance, an adverse shock
reduces the net worth of the banking sector, bank leverage will increase, and so
will the credit wedge s, causing a further deepening of the downturn.
2.3.4 Firm and Household Credit
As discussed previously, firm loans are treated as equivalent to equity, and so the
return on firm credit is simply the gross return on capital, RKt , defined in equation
(2.7). The repayment rate on household credit is the contracted nominal rateRMt−1. In
addition to the amount of total credit extended determined by the solution to
equation (2.31), the lending bank chooses to allocate credit to mortgages and










(RMt+s(1 − λ)CRHHt+s + RKt+s+1CRBt+s ),
subject to CRt  (1 − λ)CRHHt + CRBt and where CRBt  QKt Kt. The solution implies
that
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Et[Λt, t+1
PCt+1




must hold in equilibrium.
2.4 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets the nominal short-term interest rate in response to
deviations of the consumer price inflation rate from the union-wide inflation target













withweightsφπ andφy attached to inflation and output growth respectively. There
is inertia in the rule governed by φr. The union-wide variables ΠEMUt and Y
EMU
t are




 (PCt )n(PC*t )1−n(PCt−1)n(PC*t−1)1−n (2.34)
YEMUt  (Yt)n(Y*t )1−n.
With a single policy rate, the economyas presented to this point features a unit root
stemming from a single savings rate across both economies. As savers in both
countries face the same return on assets, long-run effects from transitory shocks
would prevail. For instance, if one of the economies were to draw a positive supply
shock, its net foreign asset position would improve and the economy will have a
current account surplus that would persist in the long run, with a permanent
increase in thewealth of savers. To restore the stationary property of themodel, we
assume, consistent with past modeling practice in open-economymodels, that the
central bank applies a small premium on the refinancing rate that depends on the
net foreign asset position NFAt of the home country.
13 The rates paid on central
bank credit CBt are determined by
Rt  RPt − ϑt(exp[κNFAtPYt Yt ] − 1),
13 See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for a full discussion of the techniques used to remove the
random walk in open-economy models.
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where ϑt is a stationary mean one shock to the premium, and κ the premium
elasticity. RPt  RP*t is the central policy rate, and Rt and R*t the rates paid on central
bank credit.
Central bank funds are in zero net supply, so if savings banks in the home
country borrow from the central bank, it follows that foreign country savings banks
are depositors, and Rt > R*t . The risk premium will cause the net foreign asset
position of banks in each country to adjust untilNFAt  NFA*t  0 and Rt  R*t . The
structure of the premium implies that there will be small positive profits in equi-
librium which are transferred equally to savers in the union. In the numerical
simulations, we choose κ sufficiently low to allow the rates to be very close,
generating persistent effects of shocks while ensuring that the model is stationary.
2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
In each economy, the labor market is in equilibrium when total supply by
households equals the demand from intermediate good producers
LDt  λ Lt + (1 − λ)LBt . (2.35)
The corresponding domestic capital market equilibrium condition is given by
KDt  Kt . (2.36)
Total demand for domestically produced goods include the demand from do-
mestic households HTt  λHt + (1 − λ)HBt , demand from foreign consumers
XTt  λXt + (1 − λ)XBt , demand from capital producers IKt (1 − ζ K(IKt /IKt−1 − 1)2) and
from housing good producers IDt (1 − ζ D(IDt /IDt−1 − 1)2)which are net the adjustment
costs, and demand by the government, which is given as a proportion gt of output
Yt. The implied real resource constraint is then
Yt  HTt + XTt + IKt + IDt + gtYt , (2.37)
with gt following a stationary stochastic process. The net foreign asset position
evolves according to the following nominal law of motion:
IBF
*




t−1 − Rt−1CBt−1 − R̃IB, Ft IBFt−1 + TBt , (2.38)
where the trade balance is defined as
TBt  PPt Xt − PIMt IMt . (2.39)
The bilateral terms of trade are given by






and, as discussed previously, the central bank funds are in zero net supply
worldwide, so
nCBt + (1 − n)CB*t  0. (2.41)
3 Calibration and Parametrization
A number of the structural parameters of our model are calibrated with the aim of
matching key empirical first moments. Other parameters are based on previous
estimates in the literature (see Table 1).
Table : Calibration and parametrization of model parameters.
Parameter Description Value
Β Patient agent discount factor .
βB Borrowers discount factor .
Ρ Utility weight of non-durable consumption .
τC Home-bias in consumption .
Σ Elasticity of substitution across consumption varieties .
σω Standard deviation of loan return shock .
γ Retained share of bank profits .
τIB Home-bias in interbank borrowing .
g Steady-state G/Y .
λ Fraction of savers .
ϵC Habits formation .
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity .
θC Elasticity between domestic goods/imports .
α Capital share of production .
δK Capital depreciation rate .
δD Housing depreciation rate .
ζ K Capital adjustment parameter .
ζD Housing adjustment parameter .
Ξ Calvo parameter .
Μ Monitoring costs .
M Borrowers LTV ratio .
θIB Elasticity of substitution between domestic/cross-border interbank credit 
ζσ Cross-border interbank cost coefficient .
φy Taylor rule response to output growth .
φπ Taylor rule response to inflation .
φr Taylor rule persistence .
Π Inflation target .
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On the household side, we fix the fraction of savers λ in each economy to 0.65,
close to the estimate obtained by Quint and Rabanal (2014). The annualized
inflation target is set to 2%, and the discount factor of savers (borrowers) β (βB) is
chosen to be 0.995 (0.94), ensuring a nominal steady-state annual return on risk-
free savings of around 4%. External habit in consumption κ is set at 0.564 ac-
cording to estimates of Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2008) for the euro area.
The relative share of non-durables in consumption ϱ is calibrated to be 0.82 to
target the output share of housing investment. The inverse of the Frisch labor
supply elasticity ϕ is parametrized to be 0.4 (cf. Quint and Rabanal 2014). The
quasi-share of domestic goods in total consumption τC is fixed at 0.75 to ensure a
steady-state share of imports in consumption of 25%. The elasticity of substitution
between domestic goods and imports θC is set at 1.9 in line with Quint and Rabanal
(2014) estimates.
On the production side, we choose a value of 0.3 for the share of labor α in the
Cobb-Douglas production function. Capital depreciation δK and housing depreci-
ation δD are assumed to be 10% per annum. Adjustment costs ζK in capital in-
vestment are fixed at 5.2 (following estimations in Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne
2008), while those in housing investment (ζ D) are set at 1.7 as estimated in Quint
and Rabanal (2014). The elasticity of substitution across the final goods σ is chosen
so as to ensure a steady-state mark-up of 1.35 and the Calvo parameter ξ is set to be
0.9, both in linewith estimates obtained by Christoffel, Coenen, andWarne (2008).
On the banking side, savings banks’monitoring costs, μ, are assumed to be 0.2
as in Quint and Rabanal (2014) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). For the borrowers’
loan-to-value ratio, we use the estimated value ofm = 0.55 from Iacoviello (2005).
The steady-state standard deviation of the loan return shock, σω, and the bank
dividend payment rate, 1−γ, are calibrated to 3.39 percentage points and 4.53%
respectively to target a steady-state value of the loan-to-value ratio of banks ω of
0.9, in line with typical industry leverage ratios. The default rate of banks is
calibrated to be around 0.4% in steady state, matching the average historical
default rate in the banking industry over the period 1970–2010, as well as an
equilibrium spread for mortgage and interbank loans of around 1.72 percentage
points and 10 basis points respectively over the policy rate, in line with typical
measures of the average spreads (see e.g., ECB 2009b). The share of cross-border
intra-euro area interbank borrowing τIB is set at 0.75 to match figures reported by
Colangelo and Lenza (2013). The elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign interbank funding θIB is fixed at 2, implying that these sources of funding
are not perfect substitutes. This follows Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) who
estimate the substitutability of cross-border corporate loans between the eurozone
core and periphery countries. The cross-border interbank cost parameter, ζσ, we set
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to 0.01. For a 1-standard deviation risk shock, ceterus paribus, bank default would
increase from 0.1 to 0.25%, implying a rise in the cost, ΓIB, t, of 0.1%.
On the policy side, we fix the share of government spending in GDP at 20%.
Together with the other parametrization of ourmodel, this ensures that we are able
to get close matches of the relative spending shares of consumption (59%), in-
vestment (21%) and housing investment (4.5%) in GDP with their empirical first
moments for the euro area as a whole. Regarding monetary policy, we follow
Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2008) and set the central bank response to
inflation φπ to 1.9 and to output growth φy to 0.15. Policy inertia is set at 0.87.
Finally, the standard deviations and persistence coefficients of the shock
processes are largely taken from Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2008), with the
exception of the risk shock, which is taken fromQuint and Rabanal (2014), and the
government spending shock, which has been calibrated on the basis of estimates
obtained by Smets and Wouters (2003). For the interbank risk premium shock, for
which no estimates in the literature are available, we assume a persistence of 0.8
and a standard deviation of 0.2. These are shown in Table 2.
4 Numerical Results and Analysis
To evaluate the model dynamics, we compute a second-order Taylor approxima-
tion of the decision and transition functions and simulate impulse response
functions14. In a first step, we look at the implication of our interbankmarket setup
Table : Parametrization of shock parameters.
Parameter Description Value
σA Technology shock .
σG Government spending shock .
σIB Interbank cost shock .
σσ Risk shock .
σM Monetary policy shock .
ρA Technology shock .
ρG Government spending shock .
ρIB Interbank cost shock .
ρσ Risk shock .
14 We used the dynare package to compute simulations (see Adjemian et al. 2011).
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for the transmission ofmonetary policy by considering a standardmonetary policy
shock. In a second step, we analyze how frictions in the cross-border interbank
market may affect the dynamics of the economy in the face of country-specific
idiosyncratic shocks.
4.1 The Interbank Market and the Transmission of Monetary
Policy
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of a number of variables to a reduction in the
union-wide policy rate and compares these to a modified version of our model in
which the interbank frictions are shut off, that is, the model collapses to one of
complete financial markets where the spread between bank lending rates and the
policy rate is fixed to its steady-state value.
Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a negative monetary policy shock. s(⋅) is the external
finance premium. Relative deviations from the stochastic steady state except rates, which are in
levels.
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In both instances, the interest rate controlled by the monetary authority drops
by about the same amount initially. In our baseline model, however, the unan-
ticipated reduction in interest rates leads to an increase in the value of collateral
held by lending banks. This, in turn, lowers their funding costs in the interbank
market as the perceived risk of default falls. Lending banks operating under perfect
competition will pass through the relief in funding costs to their final customers,
causingmortgage rates and financing costs faced by non-financial firms to drop by
more than the initial reduction in the key policy rate.
It is this additional fall in the borrowing conditions of households and firms
that then leads to more investment, more housing demand and, ultimately, higher
domestic demand and inflation in the currency union. In other words, like in
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the transmission of a conventional change
in monetary policy is more powerful in affecting broader macroeconomic condi-
tions. However, unlike in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the amplification
in transmission comes directly from banks operating in an interbank market
characterized by uncertainty on the part of savings banks when extending short-
term credit to counterparties in need of liquidity.
This implies that there are major differences to a situation where the financial
accelerator operates directly at the balance sheet of firms. The impact on aggregate
demand, aswell as the strength of the pass-through of interbank conditions to final
borrowing conditions, will ultimately depend on three factors: the relative share of
saver and borrower households in the economy, the structure of lending banks’
balance sheets and the degree of competition in the lending market. Starting with
the latter, the less concentrated the lending market is, the stronger is the pass
through and the more pronounced are the effects on the real economy. That is,
modifications of our model along the lines of Gerali et al. (2010), introducing
monopolistic competition in the banking sector, can be expected to dampen the
accelerator effect as banks would pass on lower interbank funding costs at a pace
slower than under our baseline model. Similarly, the larger the share of bank
lending to households, the larger the impact on output, given the role played by
private consumption in aggregate demand. And, finally, although the friction
lowers borrowing costs for firms and impatient households, Figure 1 also shows
that the policymaker keeps the interest rate higher relative to the fixed spread
economy due to increased output and inflation. Saver households hence face a
higher savings rate, causing them to consume less non-durable and durable goods
in response. This effect offsets, to some extent, the increase in housing investment
coming from borrowers.
We illustrate this last point in 1: the red dashed line shows our baselinemodel,
assuming, however, a smaller share of savers λ = 0.5. As expected, because the
financial friction reduces borrowing costs beyond the initial change in the policy
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rate, the more borrowers there are, the larger the accelerator effect. Fewer savers,
in turn, imply that the offset from a higher policy, and hence savings rate, will also
be smaller.
Overall, therefore, our simulations tend to suggest that, contrary to previous
findings in the literature (e.g., Hilberg and Hollmayr, 2011), the presence of an
interbank market can, and in many circumstances is very likely to, amplify
changes in the key policy rate. And although the mechanism is similar to the well-
known financial accelerator, there are noticeable differences in the way our model
setup can give rise to changes in the transmission of monetary policy.
4.2 Asymmetric Shocks and Cross-Country Spillovers
A key result of the previous section is that union-wide shocks will propagate
differently through the economy once financial frictions are allowed for and that it
matters whether these frictions are operating on the banking or the firm side. In
this section we will focus on the implications of our interbank market setup for the
propagation and impact of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks. Specifically, we
look at how a positive shock to the variance of the idiosyncratic loan return shock
ω(b) will affect the behavior of banks in the cross-border interbank market and
analyze the footprint this will ultimately leave on aggregate demand.
Recall that savings banks incur additional monitoring costs when taking po-
sitions in the cross-border interbank market. These costs are a function of the
prevailing level of “economic” risk (cf. equation (2.29)). Therefore, a shock that
raises the skewness of the distribution of ω(b) in one country but not in the other,
and hence increases the relative risk of bank default, will cause savings banks to
raise the risk premium they charge to borrowers resident in the economy hit by the
shock, even though the average loan return remains unchanged.
This can be seen in Figure 2: in our baseline model the funding rate in the
cross-border interbank market, RIB, Ft , increases by significantly more than
compared to a model in which banks are insensitive to both macroeconomic and
counterparty risks.15 As a result, banks with a liquidity deficit will partly substitute
more expensive foreign borrowing with domestic borrowing, forcing consumers to
15 To gain a sense of themagnitude of these deviations, note that the shock is scaled such that the
annualized probability of bank default increases by about 4% in the baseline model. This is close
to the observed increase in the expected default frequency of financial sector in the euro area in
2012 (see section 3.10 in European Central Bank 2020). Output in the home country falls by around
0.5%, and less than 0.1% in the foreign economy. In the data, real GDP in Spain and Italy fell by
around 3% year-on-year in 2012, while in contrast, France and Germany experienced only a
slowdown.
Monetary Policy and Interbank Market Fragmentation 351
dial back more vigorously their imports in response. Naturally, this effect will be
stronger the more heavily the economy’s banking sector relies on cross-border
interbank market funding, (1−τIB), or, similarly, the more difficult it is to switch
foreignwith domestic funding (θIB). This alsomeans that, should countries differ in
their financial structure, symmetric shocks too can cause differences in banks’
funding costs across the currency union. For example, an economy which pre-
dominantly finances loans to firms and households using funds from abroad will
see its overall funding costs increase more sharply in the face of an adverse shock,
thereby causing a steeper economic contraction than compared to an economy
that mainly relies on domestic funding. This stylized finding has been one of the
key aspects of the crisis in peripheral euro area economies: because many banks
funded large parts of their liquidity needs abroad, the suddenmarket freeze meant
that aggregate imports fell drastically, thereby reinforcing the macroeconomic
fallout caused by the collapse in domestic demand and the rise in funding costs.
Cross-border monitoring costs are, however, only an amplifier of a natural
response of our modeling choice. As can be seen in Figure 2, banks resident in the
foreign economy would have increased their cross-border interbank rates even in
the absence of these costs and despite a measurable reduction in the union-wide
monetary policy rate. The reason has to do with the built-in increase in the risk of
bank default: with output contracting in response to the shock, domestic banks’
leverage rises, causing foreign banks to increase their lending rates.
What is more, with lending to the real economy having become riskier in the
wake of the shock, domestic savings banks toowill ration their supply of interbank
funds and will increase the rate they charge on the remaining funds, causing a
contraction in credit supply to the real economy. The consequences are well-
known: with credit less abundant andmore expensive, both households and firms
reduce their investment and housing activities, amplifying the contraction in
aggregate demand that would have prevailed in the absence of frictions in the
interbank market.
The consequence is that interbankmarkets characterized by risky lending and
costly state verification have the potential to render monetary policy less effective
by contributing to the fragmentation of trades across borders, something that has
become evident in the euro area during and after the sovereign debt crisis. At that
time, the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy to banks in the periphery had
become severely impaired: although it cut its main refinancing rate by 85 basis
points between July 2012 and June 2014, bank lending rates to firms in Spain, for
example, fell only by some 20 basis points over the same period, reflecting, in part,
effective credit rationing in the (cross-border) interbank market. In response to
these impairments, the ECB, starting in June 2014, decided on a number of non-
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock in the home country, comparing
baseline model with a version with ζσ = 0. Relative deviations from the stochastic steady state
except rates and relativeNFA,NFA/PCY, and the probability of bankdefault, F, which are in levels.
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standard measures that aimed at restoring the transmission of monetary policy.
Some of these measures are the subject of our analysis in the next section.
5 The Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy
In this final sectionwe askwhether recent non-standardmonetary policymeasures
have been able to overcome, or mitigate, frictions in the interbankmarket. The two
policies we discuss are long-term central bank refinancing operations and asset
purchases.
5.1 Long-Term Refinancing Operations
In ourmodel economy, savings banks have access to funding from the central bank
(cf. Section 2.3.2). In addition to standard one-period loans to banks, in this policy
exercise, the operations of the central bankmay take the form of multi-period loan
contracts, similar to the ECB’s LTROs16. To prevent corner solutions whereby
savings banks will choose only short-term or only long-term funding, the central
bank sets a single target policy rate on multi-period bonds and allows the short-
term rate to be set via the zero-arbitrage condition. As discussed in Section 2.3.2,
the short-term central bank fundswill be in zero net supply union-wide. This is also
the case with long-term funds. Indeed, in equilibrium, we will find that savings
banks will not hold long-term bonds at all; the availability of these loans is suf-
ficient to introduce a wedge between the policy rate on long-term refinance op-
erations and the household saving rate.
To maintain tractability and keep the number of state variables manageable,
we follow Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)17 and introduce multi-period loan
contracts using geometrically decaying repayments over an infinite horizon. This
setup reflects the aggregation of a large number of loans at different points of
repayment and of different maturities. As well as introducing just one new state
variable rather than potentially very many with long maturities, the appeal is that
using infinitely long loans with geometrically declining repayments allows us to
control the average maturity ψ ∈ [0, 1) with just one parameter, nesting the pos-
sibility of ψ = 0, in which case it collapses to a standard one-period loan contract.
16 See e.g., https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html for infor-
mation on this policy.
17 Described in detail to analyze term premia on bonds in a working paper version of the article
(see Rudebusch and Swanson 2008). Used to introduce multi-period loan contracts in Benes and
Lees (2010).
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Every period t, a savings bank can take out a new loan CBt and agree to repay






Whenψ > 0,RLTt is no longer equivalent to an interest rate. To analyze the role of the
LTRO policy, we assume that the central bank chooses RLTt so that the average
interest rate on long-term borrowing equals the policy rate Rt. As we are using
perpetual loan repayments, we measure the average duration using Macaulay’s
duration of a stream of payments. It is then straightforward to calculate the
equivalent average nominal interest rate on the amount borrowed from the total
amount repaid. We find this leads to the following relationship between the rate
RLTt and the policy rate Rt:
Rt  ( RLTt1 − ψ)
(1/d)
(5.2)
with average loan duration d = R/(R−ψ), where R is the steady-state policy rate18.
We can then express equation (5.1) in recursive form as
CBTt  ψCBTt−1 + RLTt CBt . (5.3)
The important thing to note is that even if the bank does not borrow from the
central bank in equilibrium, as will be the case with purely symmetric shocks, the
availability of these loans is sufficient to have an important impact on the
household saving rate, a point we will return to later. Using equation 5.3 as a
constraint in the profit maximization problem of the savings bank leads to the
following first-order conditions:
ϕt  Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt (1 + ϕt+1ψ) ] (5.4)
ϕtR
LT
t  Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt RSt ]. (5.5)
18 For perpetual loan repayments, the average loan duration is measured using Macaulay’s
duration of a stream of payments, given by dt  ∑​∞t1tPVt/∑​∞t1PVt where PVt is the present value of
the cash flow (see e.g., Marrison 2002). Applying this to our example, we find in simulations that dt
experiences only tiny fluctuations around its steady-state value, and so we use the steady-state
value as a close approximation. This can be simplified to d  RR−ψ. It is then straightforward to
calculate the average interest rate given that borrowing is a convergent series.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock with central bank with and
without LTRO policy response. Relative deviations from the stochastic steady state except rates,
which are in levels.
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This, with equation (5.2), gives the spread between the policy rate Rt and the
deposit rate RSt .ϕt is the real present value of the Lagrangemultiplier on the law of
motion of repayments due and is a nominal pricing kernel for central bank credit.
Whend= 1 andψ=0, thenRLTt  Rt  RSt as in the standardmodel, andϕt is just the
nominal stochastic discount factor. As the loan duration increases so ψ > 1, the




Figure 3 shows the LTROs at work, comparing the impulse response functions
to the same risk shock analyzed before, oncewith d = 1 and oncewith d = 16 20. This
calibration mimics the four-year loan duration of the ECB’s targeted LTROs
introduced in 2014. The policy has twomajor effects. First, in the face of an adverse
shock, fewer cuts in policy rates are required to achieve the equivalent stimulus in
a multi-period loan economy. The reason is that the reduction in policy rates
lowers the average rate of interest for a longer period and hence further reduces the
effective present funding costs of forward-looking banks. That is, long-term refi-
nancing operations with fixed interest rates, such as the latest series of targeted
LTROs, ensure planning certainty for banks and thereby, in practice, providemajor
help with respect to maturity transformation between longer-term lending and
often short-term refinancing. And with banks immediately passing on the addi-
tional funding cost relief to the ultimate borrowing conditions of households and
firms, policymakers are able to frontload required accommodation and thereby
mitigate the economic downturn.
The second interesting feature of LTROs is the asymmetric impact when
economies are hit by idiosyncratic shocks. As we argued before, once d > 1 (ϕt > 0),
the deposit rate in each country will no longer be fixed to the policy rate by the zero
arbitrage condition. As equations (5.2) and (5.5) highlight, the spread between the
policy rate and the deposit rate depends on the Lagrange multiplier, itself a
function of the household stochastic discount factor. Specifically, using equations
(5.2) and (5.5) we can give the spread as
19 One difficulty with our approach is that introducing the policy, or changing the average
duration, during a model simulation would cause the mapping between the repayment rate and
the policy rate to be lost. For example, the average loan duration stems from the continued
existence of loans with a fixed parameterψ. Ifψwere time varying, it would be considerably more
difficult to compute the average loan duration or the average rate across the loans. For this reason,
we draw a comparison between a model in which the central bank provides standard one-period
credit and a long-term refinancing case with ψ > 0 and duration d > 1 fixed.
20 This corresponds to an average loan duration ψ of 0.9422.




Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt ][ϕt(1 − ψ)]1/d ,
where
ϕt  Et[Λt, t+1ΠCt (1 + ϕt+1ψ) ].
So, asymmetric shocks will affect the spread differently in each country as a first-
order effect. From equations (5.2) and (5.5), a first-order approximation suggests
that
RSt
Et[1 + ϕtψ] 
RS*t
Et[1 + ϕ*tψ] .
In other words, if the expected path of the nominal stochastic discount factor is
greater in the domestic economy than in the Etϕt+1 > Etϕ*t+1 foreign, then it follows
that RSt > R
S*
t , which implies that .
This can be seen in Figure 3. Because consumers in the foreign economy,
following the shock, expect a lower futuremarginal utility of consumption relative
to the domestic country, LTROs, by easingfinancial conditions abroad bymore, are
able to fully offset any negative spillovers of the original shock to the rest of the
currency union. Of course, the extent of the easing can differ from shock to shock,
but LTROs can generally be thought of as a powerful stabilization tool in a currency
union. This has been confirmed by recent ECB analysis (ECB 2017). They show that
from June 2014 to July 2015, i.e., after the first TLTRO operation, non-bidders in
vulnerable andnon-vulnerable economies reduced their lending rates by about the
same amount, while after the second operation, in the period from March to
December 2016, the reduction in lending rates was larger in non-vulnerable
economies, consistent with the predictions from our model. This emphasizes that
the sheer existence of the policy is enough to reduce financing conditions across
the currency union and, hence, to help central banks reach their price stability
objectives.21
5.2 Asset Purchases
The second policy instrument we analyze is asset purchases by central banks,
which became an integral part of policymakers’ toolkit after, and in some
21 We tried different parameter values in the Taylor rule and found the relative impact of the
availability of LTROs was unchanged.
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jurisdictions even before, the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Several at-
tempts have beenmade in the literature to quantify the effects of such purchases 22.
On the theoretical front, Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Gertler and Karadi
(2013) have recently made useful progress in capturing the effects of asset pur-
chases on the broader macroeconomy. In this paper, we want to focus on one
element of the ECB’s asset purchase programme that has received less attention in
the literature and that is particularly suited to study within the context of our
model setup: its ABSPP.
The aim of this programme, launched in November 2014, is to facilitate credit
provision to the real economy by freeing up bank balance sheet capacity. Although
the effects of securitization are more complex in practice, mainly related to regu-
lation, the general idea behind this programme can be illustrated by assuming that
the central bank purchases assets directly from banks. Indeed, one of the main
reasons for banks to engage in securitization is balance sheet relief: securitization
typically involves a true sale of the underlying asset to a special purpose vehicle,
removing assets from the balance sheet and thereby reducing the amount of capital
that a financial institution is required to hold. We therefore follow Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and treat asset purchases as if the central bank lends directly to the
private sector, which is a convenient shortcut to analyzing the effects of the ECB’s
ABSPP.
Specifically, the central bank issues one-period bond at the market rate and
uses the proceeds to purchase a certain share Θt of loans from lending banks.
Profits are distributed to the households via lump sum transfers23. The central bank
budget constraint can be written as
Θt(CRHHt + CRFt )  BCBt (5.6)
Tt  RCRt Θt(CRHHt−1 + CRFt−1) − RSt−1BCBt−1, (5.7)
where Tt are transfers to households and B
CB
t are central bank issued bonds. The
first constraint is that all funds raised are used to purchase assets and the second is
that all profits are transferred to households.
At the start of the period during which the asset purchase will take place, the
policymaker announces the purchase decision. This implies that the lending
banks’ first-order conditions are unchanged except for the volume of loans on
banks’ balance sheets, which changes to
22 For the United States see e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Gagnon,
Raskin, and Remache (2011); for the euro area see e.g. Blattner and Joyce (2016) and Altavilla,
Carboni, and Motto (2015).
23 Likewise, if there are losses, these are borne by households through lump-sum taxes.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock with central bank asset-
purchase policy response. Relative deviations from the stochastic steady state except rates, net
exports, PPX/P IMIM, and relative NFA, NFA/PCY, which are in levels.
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CRt  (1 − Θt)(CRHHt + CRFt ).
With this inmind,wenowexaminehowasset purchases canhelp stabilize the economy
in the face of anadverse shock, usingagain, for reasonsof comparability, a risk shock in
the domestic economy. Figure 4 shows the general workings of a temporary asset
purchase programme. In our calibration the central bank is assumed to purchase 2%of
all available assets in the first period, in equal proportions across economies, and to
hold them for four years. At this point, the assets are gradually resold to the private
sector, causing the central bank’s balance sheet to contract by 2.5% every quarter.
The message is unambiguous: asset purchases in the form of loans, either directly
or through purchases of ABS, can be an effective substitute, or complement, to re-
ductions in the key policy rate. By reducing banks’ risk exposure to the real economy,
policymakers are able to lower banks’ market-based funding needs and to compress
their external finance premium in the interbankmarket. Lower interbank funding costs,
in turn, are passed on to households and firms, which stimulate demand for loans and
mortgages and, ultimately, investment and aggregate demand. As can be seen in
Figure 4, in our example purchases of loans succeed in effectively mitigating the fall in
output and inflation without lowering the key policy rate. This means that, at the
effective lower bound, such a policy can be an effective complement to changes in the
conventional policy instrument. Note the interbankmarket lending volumes in Figure 4
mirror the asset purchases; the central bankmakes a large purchase in the first period,
the assets are held for four years before being gradually resold to the private sector.
Finally, in Figure 5, we perform a comparative analysis of the efficiency of our two
unconventional policy instruments to the same transitory risk shock. To ensure broad
comparability, bothpolicies are calibrated toensure the same target horizonof four years.
The chart emphasizes that while both policies can effectively mitigate the impact of
adverse shocks on output and inflation, asset purchases, even in relatively small size, are
likely tobemorepowerful, reflecting thedirect risk transfer fromprivate topublic balance
sheets. This means there is a trade-off for policymakers between policy effectiveness and
risk exposure. While an analysis of the optimal policy use goes beyond the scope of this
article, itmayseemadvisable tocentralbanks tochoose theoptimalpolicymixdepending
on the severity and persistence of the shock, also bearing inmind that very large adverse
shocks may affect the supply side of the economy through hysteresis effects. In these
instances, policy may prefer to minimize the initial impact of the shock by choosing a
policy that would re-establish quickly orderly trading conditions in interbank markets.
5.3 Welfare Considerations
Although the analysis of optimal policy is beyond the scope of this study, it is
possible to compare welfare outcomes conditional on the scenarios shown in
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Figure 5. We show the welfare of the alternative policies relative to the baseline
model in Figure 6. Welfare for each household is defined as the discounted sum of
future utilitywith totalwelfare given as the average,weighting households by their
population share. The figure gives this in consumption equivalence terms and
shows the period-by-period proportion of consumption that all households would
give up in order to be under the alternative policy framework24. As this is a con-
ditional welfare comparison, to give a value for the effect of a policy programme on
welfare we calculate the total value in terms of annual consumption, finding that
the asset purchase policy leads to total welfare gains of 2.7% of a single year of
Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a transitory risk shock comparing central bank asset-
purchase policy response and LTROs. Y shows relative deviations from the stochastic steady
state and Π shows level deviation.
24 To be a little more specific, each period, we solve W(Cbaselinet (1 + ξAt ))  W(CAPPt ) and
W(Cbaselinet (1 + ξBt ))  W(CLTROt ) for ξAt and ξBt , where Vt(i, j)  Ut(i, j) + β(i)Et[Vt+1(i, j)] for
household of type i in country i, and W averages V(i, j) weighting by population share.
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consumption25. The LTRO policy, in contrast, in the end leads to welfare losses
equivalent to 1.2% of annual consumption despite offering welfare gains in the
short term.
Figure 6: Welfare relative to baseline in period-by-period consumption equivalence terms.
Conditional on the impulse responses shown in Figure 5, for each period this shows value of the
policy at time t in terms of period t consumption.
Figure 7: Welfare relative to baseline in period-by-period consumption equivalence terms
conditional on a risk shock and interest rates prevented from falling from 4 quarters. For each
period this shows value of the policy at time t in terms of period t consumption.
25 The total period-by-period welfare gains add up to 2.7% of annual steady state consumption.
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This comparison does not give a full picture, as it assumes that the central
bank has full freedom to utilize conventional monetary policy. If this were not
possible, because of the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates, for example,
then the LTRO policy could be an effective substitute for conventional interest rate
adjustments. To illustrate this point, we repeat the exercise, only this time pre-
venting the interest rate from adjusting downward for four periods. The period-by-
period relative welfare for each policy is shown in Figure 7.
This time, the LTROpolicy offers totalwelfare gains equivalent to 5%of annual
consumption over the baseline case, highlighting the value of credibly promising
low-for-long interest rates. The asset purchase programme leads to welfare gains
equal to 13% of annual consumption, up from just 2.7%. Although an illustration,
the exercise indicates the potential of significant welfare gains from an expanded
policy toolkit when conventional policy is constrained.
6 Conclusion
Growing levels of excess liquidity in the wake of the ECB’s asset purchase pro-
gramme, together with attractive conditions attached to the ECB’s targeted longer-
term refinancing operations, have reduced the need of banks to seek funds in the
euro area interbank market. Although these measures have undoubtedly
contributed to restoring the transmission of monetary policy, and thereby to
reinforcing the economic expansion the euro area has been enjoying since about
mid-2013, they also mask the prevailing fragilities related to the trading of central
bank reserves in a currency union characterized by structural differences across
borders. Such differences may lead to persistent cross-border capital flows inter-
mediated, in part, by banks that are likely to price interbank loans not only ac-
cording to the credit quality of their counterparts, but taking also into account
differences in macroeconomic risk across euro area jurisdictions.
This article showed that such frictions in the interbank market may severely
constrain the ability of monetary policymakers to achieve their area-wide price
stability objective using merely conventional policy instruments. In good times,
credit frictions in the interbank market may amplify changes in the key policy rate
and contribute to boosting cross-border interbank loans, creating risks of irrational
exuberance. In bad times, pro-cyclicality in bank lending and pricing may offset
efforts by the central bank to stimulate the economy.
The good news is that the crisis has proven that unconventional policy mea-
sures can be highly effective in overcoming frictions in the interbank market. The
findings in this article confirm, by and large, this intuition. In particular, long-term
refinancing operations as well as asset purchase programmes can complement, or
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substitute for, changes in the key policy rate and ease financial conditions at a time
when access to interbank credit might be restricted or excessively expensive. This
is especially true when there is restricted room to adjust the policy rates downward
due, for example, to the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates. Limiting the
recourse to such facilities in future crises, however, requires a more forceful
convergence in the growth capacities of euro area economies, a task that lies
beyond central bank mandates.
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